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Introduction
Broadly speaking, “empiricism” is a label that
usually denotes an epistemological view that
emphasizes the role that experience plays in
forming concepts and acquiring and justifying
knowledge. In contemporary philosophy, there
are some authors who call themselves as empiri-
cists, although there are differences in the way
they define what experience consists in, how it is
related to theory, and the role experience plays in
discovering and justifying knowledge, etc. (e.g.,
Ayer 1936; Van Fraassen 2002). In contrast, in the
early modern period, empiricism was not a label
that philosophers traditionally characterized until
nowadays as empiricists (most famously, John
Locke, George Berkeley, and David Hume) used
to describe their doctrines. Indeed, as attributed to
early modern philosophical authors, empiricism is
not an actor’s category, but an analytic historio-
graphical category retrospectively applied to them
and confronted to rationalism, whose main repre-
sentatives were considered to be Rene Descartes,
Baruch Spinoza, and G.W. Leibniz. Such a narrative
began to be established by the late nineteenth-
century and described early modern empiricism as
an epistemological stance maintaining (1) that the
origin of all mental contents lies in experience
(a genetic statement), and (2) that knowledge can
only be justified a posteriori (an epistemic state-
ment). This entails that empiricists deny the existence
of innate mental contents and the possibility of a
purely a priori knowledge. In the history of early
modern science such a dichotomy has been usually
rendered in terms of the opposition between conti-
nental rationalist Cartesian science vs British empir-
icist Newtonian science. In the last four decades,
many aspects of this traditional narrative have been
criticized, and the meaning of early modern empiri-
cism is subject of renewed studies.
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The Origins of the Category
“Empiricism” and Its Historiographical
Establishment
Francis Bacon (1561–1626) has been mentioned
as an important antecedent of the opposition
between empiricists and rationalists (Priest 2007,
8; Van Fraassen 2002, 203), most notably by his
introduction of a nowadays famous simile:
“Those who have treated of the sciences have
been either empirics [empirici] or dogmatists
[dogmatici]. The empirics, in the manner of the
ant, only store up and use things; the rationalists
[rationales], in the manner of spiders, spin webs
from their own entrails” (Bacon 2004, 153). How-
ever, more nuanced, well-documented, and con-
textual research (Vanzo 2014) has convincingly
argued that in employing the Latin “empiricus” or
the English “empiric” (and its variants) in this and
other passages, Bacon was not introducing an
epistemological view but rather a scientific prac-
tice that does not fit neatly into the traditional
sense of empiricism. He qualified as empirici
those practitioners of natural philosophy who
were right in relying on experience for acquiring
knowledge but were wrong in the method they
used for deriving theories from it.
Besides Bacon, the eighteenth-century Scot-
tish philosopher Thomas Reid (1710–1796) was
also considered as an antecedent providing the
standard characterization of early modern empir-
icism. He presented the philosophies of Locke,
Berkeley, and Hume as successive stages increas-
ingly unveiling the skepticism to which the “way
of ideas” inaugurated by Descartes fatally leads
(Norton 1981; Haakonssen 2006). However, it is
Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) who offers the clos-
est account of what would become the standard
meaning of empiricism (Vanzo 2013, 2014). In
the section of the Critique of Pure Reason
(1781) entitled “The History of Pure Reason,” he
classified philosophical schools before him. With
respect to the origin of the pure cognitions of
reason (concepts and judgments), he divided phi-
losophers into empiricists (Empiristen), who claim
that cognitions derive from experience (like Aristotle
and Locke), and noologists (Noologisten) – called
rationalists (Rationalisten) in later texts – (like Plato
and Leibniz), who hold that cognitions are indepen-
dent from experience and have their source in reason
(Kant 1900, III: A852–56/B880–84; XX: 275).
While the very roots of the standard sense of
empiricism are found in Kant, the whole narrative
took full shape in the works of German Kantian
historians. Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann (1761–
1819) applied rigidly the opposition between empir-
icism and rationalism to the whole early modern
period and presented Kant’s critical philosophy as
its synthesis and endpoint. By associating philosoph-
ical systems with “national characters” in his
Geschichte der Philosophie (12 vols., 1798–1819),
he described empiricism as a typically British phe-
nomenon – having its very first origins in Francis
Bacon and Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), and later
continued by Locke, Berkeley, and Hume –, around
which he places British and non-British peripherical
figures (Pierre Gassendi (1592–1655), Claude
Guillermet de Bérigard (1578–1663), Jacob Böhme
(1575–1624), and Edward Herbert of Cherbury
(1583–1648)) (Micheli 2015).
This “epistemological paradigm,” focusing the
history of philosophy on the problem of knowl-
edge (Haakonssen 2006), was gaining circulation
beyond the limits of the German-speaking world
and finally became dominant in the Western phil-
osophical canon in the first decades of the twenti-
eth century (Vanzo 2016). Since then, it has been
the most commonly adopted framework for
interpreting the early modern period and impacted
on the representation of philosophical currents of
later times. Nineteenth-century philosophy has
been usually represented in terms of “national
philosophies,” by replicating the earlier tripartite
division “British empiricism, Continental rational-
ism, German critical philosophy” now under the
labels “Franco-British empiricism/sensualism,
French spiritualism, German idealism” (Antoine-
Mahut and Manzo 2019). Later, in the twentieth
century the traditional dichotomy rationalism-
empiricism was often reinforced by being consid-
ered as an antecedent of the divide between conti-
nental and anglophone philosophy in contemporary
philosophy.
2 Empiricism, Early Modern
Revisionism and Critical Approaches
Although some historians still maintain the main
lines of the traditional view of empiricism as a sort
of normative idealized type (e.g., Bennett 2001,
Priest 2007), since the 1980s the understanding of
empiricism became more nuanced and re-
formulated in the wake of the reassessment of
the dichotomy empiricism – rationalism (Norton
1981; Loeb 1981; Cottingham 1988; Woolhouse
1988; Ayers 1998; Haakonssen 2006; Rutherford
2006). Newer historiographical approaches
attempt to avoid both anachronism and a Euro-
centric reduction of the entire early modern period
to the problem of knowledge. Instead, they aim at
describing the complexities and the great diversity
of attitudes and doctrines toward experience, rea-
son, and scientific method maintained by early
modern actors. The canonical philosophers are
no longer seen as members of opposite and rigidly
closed parties that teleologically moved toward
the conformation of an ideal internally consistent
system. The national allegiances are dismissed as
untenable historiographical clichés, and the epis-
temological paradigm of early modern philosophy
constructed by this narrative has been challenged.
Empiricism is characterized in far more flexible
and complex terms by focusing on actors’ dis-
courses and practices, by recognizing their vari-
ous historical debts and affiliations, and by going
beyond the narrow limits of theoretical philoso-
phy in order to incorporate into the analysis the
practices and developments of several disciplines
of natural science.
The once oversimplified oppositions and affil-
iations, as well as the “myth of British empiri-
cism” (Norton 1981), are severely undermined by
newer studies. On the one hand, continuities of
empiricism with Cartesianism are found in a great
number of Cartesian natural philosophers across
Europe (e.g., Robert Desgabets (1610–1618) and
Henricus Regius (1598–1679)), who argued that
observation, experience, and/or experiment play a
key role in knowledge acquisition (Nyden and
Dobre 2013). On the other hand, the association
of eighteenth-century empiricism with New-
tonianism has been relativized, not only due to
the fact that the plurality of readings of Newton
entailed several receptions, but also because some
forms of empiricism were developed by Italian,
French, Dutch, and German traditions (Biener and
Schliesser 2014; Bodenmann and Rey 2018).
Thirdly, the tradition of experimental philosophy
undoubtedly played a major role in the conforma-
tion of empiricism (Gaukroger 2014; Feingold
2016). Thus, the several forms of empiricism
that were developed across the period are rather
an outcome of the exchange, dialog, and interac-
tion between several traditions, at a time in which
several disciplines (natural philosophy, medicine,
chemistry, psychology, etc.) were establishing the
rules of their empirical methods, and their patterns
for observation and experimentation (Wolfe 2010;
Crignon et al. 2013; Nyden and Dobre 2013;
Bodenmann and Rey 2018). In addition, to distin-
guish several kinds of empiricism has proved
helpful to obtain a comprehensive description of
empiricist attitudes to be found in history (Garrett
1997, 29–38; Lowe 1995, 32–33).
An intellectual reappraisal can have two differ-
ent goals. On the one hand, it can attempt at giving
up long-established categories and replacing them
by other mutually exclusive distinctions. Or, on
the other hand, it can just attempt at not idealizing
the categories any longer, and consequently
redefining them more properly to obtain a better
understanding of the past. This second option
seems historiographically more plausible for two
reasons. On the one hand, because conceptual
history shows that long-established concepts,
such as empiricism and many others, tend to
remain in our discourses despite the criticisms
they may receive (Bodenmann and Rey 2018).
On the other hand, because it makes sense to
keep the analytic category empiricism alive and
give it an adequate content to understand the way
in which some early modern thinkers perceived
themselves as taking part in a certain tradition and
to describe the oppositions and allegiances about
the theory of knowledge that indeed took place in
history.
Hence, it seems that a suitable starting point
for interpretation consists in placing empiricism
within a larger historical naturalistic tradition dat-
ing back to ancient atomism that subordinates
reason to experience for the acquisition of
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knowledge of the natural world and the formation
of the concepts. Likewise, rationalism can be
understood as taking part in a tradition of Platonic
theological lineage, maintaining that the princi-
ples ruling the order of the world are evident to
human reason (Ayers 2007; cf. Lennon 1993).
However, such an initial hermeneutical frame-
work should avoid two mistakes that were present
in the earlier dominant account: antagonism and
binarism. In the first place, the historiographical
focus on the “battle,” i.e., the agonistic character
of the relation of empiricism to rationalism, is one
of the main causes that contributed to trans-
forming those labels into normative clichés and
essentialized ideal types. In the second place, it
would be a mistake to presuppose that the great
diversity of the early modern period should be
reduced to two mutually exclusive possibilities,
and that there were no other options. Only a her-
meneutical perspective that avoids the prejudices
of antagonism and binarism allows for a better
understanding of the varieties of empiricism as
well as the eclectic and heterogeneous stances
existent in the period. It also makes it possible to
claim that empiricist philosophers could perfectly
endorse rationalist theses without being untrue to
their theoretical epistemic commitments. In that
sense, to replace the standard narrative by apply-
ing actors’ categories like “experimental philoso-
phy” and “speculative philosophy” (as Anstey
2005 has proposed) may be helpful to understand
some discussions maintained by certain figures in
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, particu-
larly around the Royal Society. But if they are
employed from a binarist and antagonist point of
view, they run the risk of reproducing the draw-
backs of the traditional account.
First Representatives of Early Modern
Empiricism
As we have seen, the post-Kantian standard nar-
rative has considered British Francis Bacon and
Thomas Hobbes as the very first exponents of
early modern empiricism. As it has been said,
the genetic statement is the reverse of innatism.
But it is worth noting that what anti-innatism
rejects is the nativism of mental contents and not
of faculties, operations, dispositions, or principles
of association of the human mind.
Once this clarification is made, the stance of
Francis Bacon does not offer enough evidence to
conclude beyond any doubt that he was a strong
supporter of the genetic statement. He was likely
familiar with the widespread dictum, often attrib-
uted to Aristotle, nihil est in intellectu quod non
fuerit in sensu (there is nothing in the intellect/
mind which was not first in the senses) (Cranefield
1970; Wolfe 2018). And some traces of this prin-
ciple might be found in his claiming that the pro-
cess of cognition begins in the senses, “the doors of
the intellect” through which the images of particu-
lar things enter into the human mind (Bacon
1857–1874, 1: 494–495, 2004, 342–343). Like-
wise, he says “of those things which have not
offered themselves to the sense at all there can be
no imagination, not even a dream” (Bacon 1996 VI
96–99). However, this does not entail an explicit
denial of the innatism ofmental contents. As for the
justification of knowledge, being the most famous
defender of experimentalism at the first stage of the
early modern period, Bacon believed that knowl-
edge of the natural world should be justified a
posteriori. A naïve reading would consider him
as sided with the “ants” of his famous simile. But
he seems to have thought that the failures of
empirics/ants were even worse than those of the
rationalists/spiders (Bacon 2004, 100–101). In fact,
he affirms that the best option is the one represented
by the bees, whowisely combine “the experimental
and the rational faculties” of the mind, both of
which are equally valuable and necessary to obtain
true knowledge. In sum, in Bacon’s case, although
the epistemic statement can be found, the genetic
statement is not strong enough as to consider him
the “founder of early modern empiricism.”
Hobbes explicitly endorses the genetic state-
ment by adopting the dictum nihil est and by
developing a detailed theory of perception that
not only denies innatism of mental contents, but
also engages with a full materialist description of
the cognition process (Hobbes 1996, §1–2).
Unlike Bacon, Hobbes is not an experimental
philosopher and he does not consider that the
ultimate justification of every kind of science
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can be a posteriori. Geometry is the science pro-
viding a model for science. He believes that evi-
dence of universal propositions cannot be
obtained by recourse to sense and memory,
because they are fallible and only provide infor-
mation of particular instances. Only reason can
reach universal conclusions by its capacity of
naming particulars, combining names and
constructing chains of deductions in a computa-
tional way (Hobbes 1996, §9). For that reason,
mathematics and civil science – that is, sciences
that make their own objects – are in a better
position to attain certainty than natural science –
a science that departs from the observations of
their objects and must infer their universal causes.
Experience plays a role in justification but is
unable to provide evidence for universal proposi-
tions (Sorell 1986).
Long ago it was noticed that before Hobbes,
the French Pierre Gassendi (1592–1655) fully
embraced the two empiricist statements as under-
stood by the traditional narrative. Gassendi adopts
an empiricist explanation of the origin of ideas
and develops a theory for justifying knowledge
that, among other methods, combines hypothesis
with deductions. Hypothesis are the empirical
starting points of science and are to be maintained
as long as they are warranted by experience.
Deduction provides evidence for empirical
knowledge-claims, but since the ultimate basis
of cognition is probabilistic, we never can reach
certainty about the natural world. Thus, Gassendi
constructed an empiricist epistemology that,
rejecting dogmatism, promoted a moderate scep-
ticism (Fisher 2005).
Empiricism and British Canonical
Philosophers
When considering who the main exponents of the
empiricist tradition are, the triad Locke, Berkeley,
and Hume is inescapably mentioned. The first two
parts of this section (“The Origin of Ideas” and
“Knowledge Justification”) will specify and clar-
ify the sense in which Locke and Hume can be
classified as empiricists, considering the extent to
which their philosophical proposals fit in the
genetic and the epistemic statements. It will be
shown that in their philosophies there are ele-
ments that belong to both the so-called rationalist
and empiricist traditions, and their relative weight
within their thought is not in every topic on the
side of what is habitually understood as empiri-
cism. This can be considered as evidence favoring
a more nuanced and less antagonistic view of what
these two traditions stand for. The third part of the
section (“The Place of Berkeley”) will provide a
short review of the reasons why Berkeley does not
fit easily in the category empiricism. In line with
Reid’s purposes, Berkeley’s place between Locke
and Hume makes sense as a link in the chain that
inevitably leads to skepticism, but the legitimacy
of his inclusion becomes challenged once one
realizes that skepticism was one of the main tar-
gets of Berkeley’s criticisms. For that reason,
Berkeley’s stance deserves a separated
consideration.
The Origin of Ideas
It can be affirmed that Locke’s case fully fulfils the
genetic statement. Book I of the Essay concerning
Human Understanding (1690) is dedicated in its
entirety to rejecting the existence of innate ideas.
Locke makes it clear that what he is refuting is the
possibility that there are specific contents or prin-
ciples that are universally imprinted in the minds
of men, both of speculative character – e.g., the
principle of noncontradiction (E 1.1.4) – and of
moral character – e.g., “To do as one would be
done to” (E 1.2.7). Once Locke refutes the possi-
bility that our mind contains certain original con-
tents stamped upon it, he must then offer an
alternative explanation regarding the origin of
ideas. Hence, he postulates his famous account
of the mind being like a blank sheet, empty of
characters, in the sense of empty of ideas, which
acquires its materials from experience (E 2.1. 2,
2.11. 17). The important thing then is to determine
what is meant by “experience.”
Locke is often considered to understand expe-
rience in terms of ideas, which he defines as
“whatsoever is the object of the understanding
when a man thinks” (E Intro 8, see 2.1.1). How-
ever, he defines experience as “our observation
employed either, about external sensitive objects,
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or about the internal operations of our minds
perceived and reflected on by ourselves”
(E 2.1.2). It can be noticed that Locke does not
affirm that the materials of thought – i.e., ideas –
constitute experience themselves, but rather come
from experience, understood as the action of
observing sensible external events and internal
operations of the mind. Locke also emphasizes
that the process of producing ideas is gradual
(E 2.1.6-8), so time and familiarity with what we
observe are essential in order for the mind to be
able to recognize, classify, and use them in rea-
soning. Therefore, rather than proposing a mere
identification between experience and ideas,
Locke links the former with certain features that
give rise to ideas such as observation, temporal
extension, and familiarization, which involve the
ability to recognize, classify, and systematize the
acquired contents.
It has been believed that Hume is urged as
Locke to fight against the possibility of the exis-
tence of innate knowledge and, therefore, adheres
to his position (Stroud 1977, 23–24, Dicker 2002,
2). This is supposed to be expressed in the copy
principle, by means of which Hume argues that, in
its first appearance, every simple idea is identical
to and preceded by a simple impression
(T 1.1.1.5). However, Hume does not seem to
show as much urgency as Locke about it and,
although he states that the doctrine of innate
ideas has been refuted (T 1.3.14.6), he also points
out that the arguments of anti-innatists can be
reduced to the statement that ideas are preceded
and caused by impressions, emphasizing that
what distinguishes them is the strength and vivac-
ity of the latter (T 1.1.1.12). In the Abstract
(1740), he adds that “it is evident our stronger
perceptions or impressions are innate, and that
natural affection, love of virtue, resentment, and
all the other passions, arise immediately from
nature” (ABST 6). This means that Hume’s dis-
tinction between impressions and ideas leads him
to deny the innate character of ideas only but not
necessarily that of impressions, while for Locke
there is no innate mental content at all. Hume
reaffirms this position in An Inquiry concerning
Human Understanding (1748) when he defines
innate as “what is original or copied from no
precedent perception,” which allows him to state
that “all our impressions are innate, and our ideas
not innate” (EHU 2.9n). Therefore, it is less than
obvious that Hume must be lined up with Locke’s
radical anti-innatism, much less that simple
impressions of sensation can be identified with
simple ideas proposed by his predecessor.
It can be noticed, then, that the genetic state-
ment cannot be interpreted equally when applied
to Locke than to Hume. In the first place, that is
due to Hume’s particular interpretation of
innatism, which is not understood in terms of
from anything else. Moreover, if this definition
is applied retrospectively to Locke’s thinking, he
can even be labeled as an innatist, because he
considers that both sensation and reflection are
original sources of ideas (E 2.1.4). Secondly,
another important difference between Locke and
Hume is the latter’s skepticism about the origin of
sensory impressions, which arises “in the soul
originally, from unknown causes” (T 1.1.2.1,
see. 2.1.1.1, EHU 12.11). The possibility of
establishing a causal connection between impres-
sions of sensation and their supposed extramental
sources is out of human reach, since “we may
observe a conjunction or a relation of cause and
effect between different perceptions, but can
never observe it between perceptions and objects”
(T 1.4.2.47, see EHU 12.12). Hume does not
appeal to Divine guarantee in order to ensure
correspondence between simple ideas and the
qualities of the external material objects that
cause them, as Locke does (E 2.30.1, 2.31.2,
2.32.14). That is why the extent of his skepticism
about the possibility of getting to know the out-
side world is deeper than in Locke.
As in the case of Locke, experience involves in
Hume observation, that is, a deliberate act by
which the mind focuses its attention on those
phenomena that arise before the senses or in the
mind itself. It also involves a temporal dimension,
that is, repeated observation of objects that leads
us to be acquainted with their possible qualities,
causes, and effects (EHU 4.6), which in turn
imply the mental capacity to organize the objects
observed in classes and recognize types of rela-
tionships between them. This capacity allows us
to form a “collection” of cases (EHU 8.7) that
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remain in the mind and operate as the foundation
or justification of our beliefs. It allows us to
understand and discern each event in our environ-
ment and to make causal inferences (EHU 5.4),
which by definition take us beyond what is present
to sense perception (EHU 5.3).
Finally, to understand experience in terms of
sensation only has often led historians to assess
that within the empiricist tradition the mind plays
a passive role, at least in the first steps of knowl-
edge, since its function would initially be
restricted to receiving sensible stimuli (e. g.,
Taylor 1964; Mounce 1999, 24; Hatfield 2014;
Glenney and Silva 2019). Therefore, it is also
necessary to review this point to offer a more
accurate view. Locke argues that “in bare naked
perception, the mind is, for the most part, only
passive, and what it perceives, it cannot avoid
perceiving” (E 2.9.1, see 2.1.25, 2.22.2).
However, this quotation does not constitute
enough evidence to infer that the mind or, more
specifically, perception, is passive. Locke himself
acknowledges that the notion of perception has
several meanings. In a broad sense, it is equivalent
to thinking in general, understood as the opera-
tions the mind exerts on its ideas, “the mind is
active; where it, with some degree of voluntary
attention, considers anything” (E 2.9.1). Later on,
he distinguishes between three types of percep-
tion: the perception of ideas in the mind, the
meaning of signs, and the agreement or disagree-
ment between ideas (E 2.21.5). Specifically, with
respect to the first type of perception, he argues
that in order for a bodily affection to become an
idea, it should be noticed by the mind, “wherein
consists of actual perception” (E 2.9.3). How
should mind’s passivity be understood, then?
First, it is possible to regard it as an aspect of
perception that is linked to the inevitability of
recording what is present to the mind: there is no
stimulus that reaches the mind without being
noticed by it. This argument, in turn, is grounded
in Locke’s anti-innatism: there is nothing that is in
the mind that cannot be perceived (E 1.1.5). Sec-
ond, it is also possible to connect this sense of
passivity to involuntariness, given that in E 2.9.1
Locke speaks of mental content that is not volun-
tarily sought by the mind, but bursts into
consciousness, so to speak, and can only be
attended to. Finally, passivity can be explained
by the fact that the mind cannot create or destroy
any simple ideas. Once such ideas are in the mind,
“the understanding can no more refuse to have,
nor alter when they are imprinted, nor blot them
out and make new ones itself” (E 2.1.25). It is
possible that Locke appeals to the mind’s passiv-
ity as resource to guarantee that simple ideas are
real, adequate, and true, since if mental activity is
minimized when perceiving the qualities of
objects, the margin of error is also reduced and
the correspondence between these qualities and
simple ideas is protected from the risks of free
will. In addition, it should be noted that Locke
himself points out in E 2.9.1 that the mind is “for
the most part” passive, and not completely
passive.
Hume does not refer to the passivity of the
mind or the allegedly passive nature of perception
in his writings. As it has been shown, the origin of
perceptions is an issue that remains undefined and
surrounded by a veil of skepticism. The mind can
only perceive its own contents and can never
establish a reliable connection between them and
their supposed external causes. There is a single
passage where Hume mentions something that
could be linked to the pretended passivity of the
mind regarding sensory impressions: “When both
the objects are present to the senses along with the
relation, we call this perception rather than rea-
soning; nor is there in this case any exercise of the
thought, or any action, properly speaking, but a
mere passive admission of the impressions thro’
the organs of sensation” (T 1.3.2.2). At first
glance, it is possible to understand that Hume
openly states that sensitive perception does not
involve any mental activity, other than the mere
admission of what is presented to the senses.
However, as in the case of Locke, Hume offers a
broad and explicit definition of perception, which
he openly associates with action: “the mind can
never exert itself in any action, which we may not
comprehend under the term of perception and
consequently that term is no less applicable to
those judgments, by which we distinguish moral
good and evil, than to every other operation of the
mind” (T 3.1.1.2, v. T 1.2.6.7). Moreover, within
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the actions that Hume considers as perceptions in
T 3.1.1.2, he lists sensations such as seeing and
listening. In short, textual evidence leads us to
conclude that both Locke and Hume predomi-
nantly conceive perception in an active rather
than passive sense (see Yolton 1963, 54–55,
65–67; Mackie 1976, 210; Losonsky 2001,
72–75; Biro 2009, 48).
Knowledge Justification
When addressing the issue of knowledge justifi-
cation, it is important to keep in mind that Locke
does not use the distinction a priori / a posteriori.
Hume generally opposes abstract or a priori rea-
soning to inferences based on experience (EHU
4.6-10, 4.18, 7.15n13) and does not use the term a
posteriori in his theory of knowledge. Both
authors consider knowledge as the result of a
mental process where raw material supplied by
means of experience is as relevant as the opera-
tions that the mind exerts on them. Therefore,
experience is a necessary but not sufficient condi-
tion to elaborate knowledge. It plays an important
role in the production of ideas, and out of these
materials, reason produces knowledge of different
kinds, some of which can be justified without
having recourse to experience at all.
Locke defines knowledge as the perception of
the relationship of agreement or disagreement
between ideas (E 4.2.1). Within perception,
Locke distinguishes various degrees of clearness:
intuition, demonstration, and sensation. Intuition
reaches the highest degree of clearness because it
implies the immediate apprehension of the rela-
tionship between ideas; hence it is the most certain
knowledge that the human mind can reach
(E 4.2.1). Demonstrative knowledge follows in
clearness, since in this case the mind does not
perceive agreement or disagreement between
ideas immediately, but through other ideas
(E 4.2.2-7). Locke notes that usually mathematics
is considered as the only realm subject to intuitive
or demonstrative knowledge. However, he
believes that intuition and demonstration are not
an exclusive privilege of number, extension, and
figure, but that “it may possibly be want of due
method and application in us, and not of sufficient
evidence in things, that demonstration has been
thought to have so little to do in other parts of
knowledge” (E 4.2.9). The mind can potentially
perceive the agreement or disagreement between
ideas immediately or mediated by other ideas in
any field of knowledge. For example, Locke con-
siders that moral ideas are capable of demonstra-
tion as much as Euclid’s axioms (E 4.3.18). What
ultimately prevent us from reaching intuitive and
demonstrative knowledge in all areas are our cog-
nitive limitations rather than the nature of the
objects to be known.
For Locke, knowledge consists of an
intramental activity, independent of the real exis-
tence of the content of ideas – therefore it can be
claimed to be a priori. Mathematicians’ state-
ments about the quadrature of the circle are
independent of the existence of any circle in the
world, just as moral discourses and definitions are
independent of men’s lives; so in both areas it is
possible to reach certainty without recourse to
experience, since it is knowledge that is
constructed entirely from mental models or real
essences to which we can have full access
(E 4.4.8). But what happens with sensation? It is
not defined as the perception of a certain kind of
relation between ideas but as the perception of the
relation between ideas and particular external
existences (E 4.1.7). Nevertheless, Locke clas-
sifies it as knowledge and not as opinion
(E 4.2.14, 4.11.3). What leads him to do so?
Within his philosophy, there is no place for skep-
tical arguments that might call into question
whether the ideas we have come from a real
object, a dream or are an outcome of our fantasy
(E 4.2.14). Therefore, the perception we have that
certain ideas come from particular external
objects can reach a degree of certainty enough to
constitute a case of knowledge, and we can be sure
that the senses do not err in the information they
provide us regarding the things outside our minds
(E 4.11.2).
Intuitive and demonstrative knowledge, being
independent of the existence of the objects to
which ideas represent, is universal in nature. On
the other hand, knowledge about the existence of
what is represented by ideas is about particulars
and is tied to the actual existence of objects that
affect the senses in the present moment or that are
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clearly remembered (E 4.3.21, 4.11.9, 4.11.11
4.11.13). This latter kind of knowledge can be
considered to be justifiable a posteriori, since
there is no way to verify the existence of particular
objects and beings but through the affections their
qualities produce in the organs of sensation.
Hume makes a distinction between two fields
of knowledge: relations of ideas, and matters of
fact and existence (EHU 4.1). These fields are
similar to Locke’s distinction between intuition
and demonstration on one side, and sensation on
the other. The meaning of intuition and demon-
stration in Hume is very much the same that can
be found in Locke (T 1.3.1.2, T 1.3.7.3), but
Hume restricts intuitive and demonstrative knowl-
edge to the scope of the relations of ideas, while
Locke argues that there are matters of existence
that can be known intuitively, such as our own
existence, or demonstratively, as the existence of
God (E 4.9.1). Hume limits relations of ideas to
mathematics. Regarding matters of fact, he argues
that in this area knowledge is not limited only to
what is present to the senses or is clearly remem-
bered, but also and fundamentally to events and
objects that are not present before the senses nor
can be found in memory records. The means by
which we get to know about these kind of events
and objects are causal inferences (EHU 4.3-4),
although such inferences do not reach the degree
of certainty of intuitive and demonstrative knowl-
edge but counts only as opinion.
Apart from those areas in which certainty can
be attained, both philosophers recognize that there
are other occasions where the mind cannot recog-
nize without a doubt the relationship between two
ideas or objects, but can only state it with a greater
or lesser degree of probability, from what has been
frequently observed to happen in most cases
(E 4.15.1, 4.16.6-9, 4.17.17; T 1.3.6.7). Both
agree that probable knowledge is a posteriori,
that is, achieved entirely through sensation and
experience, and they prefer to call it opinion or
belief rather than knowledge (E 4.15.3; T 1.3.7.3-
5), even though they have different conceptions of
belief. For example, Locke points out that the
possibility of determining the coexistence of the
qualities that make up particular substances only
reaches the degree of probability, because we can
never fully account for all of them, nor is there a
necessary connection or inconsistency between
most of these qualities that could be discovered
a priori (E 4.12.9-10). In this case, all we can
learn about it is by means of trials, observations,
and natural histories (E 4.12.12). This is a kind of
knowledge always capable of being reviewed,
rectified, and expanded; it is unfinished by nature.
Hume considers that all causal inferences about
matters of fact can only reach the degree of prob-
ability because this kind of knowledge, unlike the
strictly sensitive one about the existence of partic-
ular objects mentioned by Locke, implies an infer-
ence that connects the present testimony of the
senses or memory with something that is absent
and not immediately perceived (T 1.3.2.3 SB 74),
which is supported by previous experience of its
constant conjunction (EHU 4.6). Although there
are conjunctions that have a high degree of uni-
formity, within matters of fact it is always possible
that an opposite case occurs, which weakens the
constancy of that conjunction (E 4.2). One of
Hume’s great contributions to the history of phi-
losophy is to review the nature of inferential
knowledge about questions of fact and existence –
a topic that Locke does not deal with –, which
leads him to his famous analysis and criticism of
the notion of causality, and the formulation of the
problem of induction.
In sum, it can be argued that Locke believes
there is a core of truths that are independent of
experience, within which mathematics and moral
propositions can be counted. In addition, he con-
siders the real existence of particular material
objects as a kind of knowledge, even though it is
reached a posteriori. In the case of Hume, knowl-
edge is strictly identified with the truths based in
intuition and demonstration, which by definition
are independent of experience, within which only
mathematics is counted; while everything that
falls within matters of fact is known empirically
and only reaches the degree of probability.
The Place of Berkeley
Of all philosophers traditionally considered as
British empiricists, George Berkeley is beyond
any doubt the one who most notably does not fit
easily into this category (there is a controversy on
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this matter, see Bracken 1974; Loeb 1981; Ayers
2005). Although he shares some points with
Locke and Hume regarding epistemic matters,
his metaphysical and epistemic concerns are
quite opposite to theirs.
On the one hand, Berkeley certainly maintains
the genetic and the epistemic statements.
Although in a passage of his posthumous Philo-
sophical Commentaries or Notebooks he seems to
endorse innatism (“There are innate Ideas i.e.,
Ideas created with us” Berkeley 1948–57, I §
645, 79), his most consistently maintained stance
is openly anti-innatist. Senses are required to have
ideas since “if it were not for them the mind could
have no knowledge no thought at all” (Berkeley
1948–1957, I: § 539, 67; cf. ib. § 318, 39; II: § 1,
41). As for the justification of knowledge, Berke-
ley maintained that cognition can be achieved
either by intuitive or by demonstrative reasoning,
admitting this distinction in a similar way to that
of Locke’s, but rejecting its skeptical connotations
(Berkeley 1948–57, II: § 230; Ayers 2005). These
views evidently make him close to Locke, whose
philosophy Berkeley read attentively. But, on the
other hand, Berkeley considered that Locke’s phi-
losophy involved risky consequences, for it inev-
itably tended to skepticism/skepticism and
atheism. Those unacceptable stances resulted
from a wrong metaphysical starting point: the
assumption that the material substance exists.
Thus, although he shares some epistemic empiri-
cist theses with Locke, it cannot be said that he
was part of the same “philosophical club” as him.
To the contrary, Berkeley’s main philosophical
goal was precisely to counter the skeptic and
atheist consequences of Lockean theses.
In addition, Berkeley thinks of the distinction
between minds and material bodies in Cartesian
terms. By assuming that a gap separates minds
from bodies, he argues that ideas of the mind are
unable to resemble the material bodies that they
are supposed to represent. Given the fact that an
idea cannot resemble but an idea, Berkeley
thought that in order to secure the possibility of
certain knowledge, ontology should be restricted
to minds and ideas perceived by minds. Thus,
Berkeley’s philosophy, on the one hand, replaced
the metaphysics that affirmed the existence of
matter by an idealism according to which there
only exist ideas and minds. On the other hand,
Berkeley rejected representational or indirect real-
ism and maintained, instead, a phenomenalist
approach: what we know are ideas, i.e., phenom-
ena occurring in minds.
The permanent existence of the objective
world can be secured only if an infinite divine
mind is postulated. For that reason, in contrast to
Locke’s and Hume’s philosophy, God plays a
central role in Berkeley’s idealism. God is the
mind in which all the ideas constituting the objec-
tive and intersubjective world are present. Other-
wise, ideas would perish whenever a finite mind
stops thinking on them. The sky, the houses, and
the other minds would exist intermittently as men-
tal items of human minds. In addition, God orders
objective ideas in a harmonious and coherent way.
We call “laws of nature” those ideas that we per-
ceive as regularly – but not necessarily –
connected. The succession of these ideas can be
changed if God’s will decides to do so. In this
approach, we can see not only the traces of what
would be part of Hume’s analysis of the idea of
causality but also the proximity of Berkeley’s
thought to Malebranche.
In sum, Berkeley’s adherence to genetic and
epistemic statements connects him to a certain
degree to Locke and Hume. But none of these
statements took center stage in Berkeley’s con-
cerns: they play a secondary role in his proposal.
His robust commitment to defend God’s existence
and criticize skepticism and atheism are marks
linking him with Malebranche and Cartesianism.
That is why Berkeley cannot be considered simply
as an empiricist or a rationalist. His thought does
not perfectly match with either of these labels.
This is one of the many instances indicating that
the early modern philosophy and science should
not be reduced to two antagonistic and mutually
exclusive trends.
Empiricism, Skepticism, and Materialism
An important derivation from the traditional
account is the association of empiricism with
two major philosophical and scientific trends:
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skepticism and materialism. The link of empiri-
cism with skepticism was early established by
Reid in the eighteenth century. He not only
constructed the lineage Locke-Berkeley-Hume,
but also joined them together with Descartes and
Malebranche –who for many historians are on the
side of the rationalists – in what he refers to as the
“ideal system” or the “Cartesian system.” This
means that the complete sequence, as it appears
in Reid’s An Inquiry into the Human Mind (1764),
does not refer to either the origin of knowledge or
its method of justification. Reid argues that these
authors have in common their defense of a repre-
sentationalist theory of knowledge that he sum-
marizes in the motto: “nothing is perceived but
what is in the mind that perceives it” (Reid 2010,
4). And Reid’s concern about representationism is
that it inevitably leads to universal skepticism.
The link of empiricism with skepticism was
reinforced, from a very different perspective, by
Kant’s and post-Kantian narratives and still
remains in most accounts of the early modern
period. In fact, as we have seen, many, but not
all, of the most famous representatives of empiri-
cism adopted skeptical stances.
The association of empiricism with material-
ism took place particularly during the French
eighteenth century and was directly related to the
reception of Locke’s philosophy in France. The
first significant reception was constituted by the
“sensualism” of Étienne Bonnott de Condillac
(1714–1780) that reworked Locke’s theory of
ideas. Although Condillac was not a materialist,
somehow his work played as a stimulus to explor-
ing the consequences of the Locke’s “thinking mat-
ter” hypothesis. From then on, some Enlightenment
philosophers explained the perception and cognition
process in physiological terms, by arguing that the
mind is as material as the body (Julien Offray de La
Mettrie (1709–1751), Denis Diderot (1713–1784),
Claude-Adrien Helvétius (1715–1771), Paul Henri
Thiry d’Holbach (1723–1789), etc.). This material-
istic ontology, which departed from an empiricist
theory of knowledge, entailed important moral and
political consequences and in some cases was
attached to atheist stances (Yolton 1983; Wolfe
2018).
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